POLYBIUS ON THE CAUSES OF THE THIRD PUNIC WAR

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FROM POLYBIUS' ACCOUNT of the Third Punic War only exiguous fragments survive of Books 36 and 38. The casualties include his study of causes, promised at 3.5.5, where he says that the Romans, "for reasons (διὰ τὰς . . . αἰτίας) to be mentioned later, attacked the Carthaginians after resolving initially to displace them, and later to destroy them utterly." Although traces of his judgment subsist, to the best of my knowledge there exists no full systematic reconstruction of Polybius' formal analysis of causes. An examination of this problem will help to clarify not only his thinking about the Third Punic War but also his general attitude towards Roman imperialism. Polybius explained Roman action at two stages, which represent the two phases of the war. The inception of hostilities, culminating in the surrender of Carthage, marks the first stage, and the subsequent decision of the Carthaginians to resist, which ultimately led to the destruction of their city and the annexation of their country by Rome, constitutes the second stage. In what follows, I propose to examine the Polybian analysis of causes for the initial phase of the conflict.

In its most elaborate form, Polybius' scheme for explaining wars comprises three elements: a beginning (ἀρχή), a pretext (πρόφασις), and a cause (αἰτία).[1] A beginning is the first attempt or action in a war already decided upon. A pretext is an alleged reason for going to war. A cause is anything that genuinely influences a decision to fight a war.[2]

Although the beginning, pretext, and cause of the Third Punic War are not identified in the extant text of Polybius, they can be reconstructed with some confidence. In general, the historian's tripartite scheme is applied to the initiatory action and to the motives, alleged and real, of the party responsible for the first overt step in a war.[3] Thus his scheme usually embraces one side

The following special abbreviations are used: *ANRW* = *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (Berlin, 1972–); *ORF*^{2} = *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*^{2}, ed. Henrica Malcovati (Turin, 1955); *RDGE* = R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East: Senatus Consulta and Epistulae to the Age of Augustus* (Baltimore, 1969). All dates are B.C. Three types of dating are employed: the Julian year (e.g., 152), the Roman consular year (e.g., consular year 151), and Polybius' Olympiad year (e.g., 151/0).

1. On Polybius' tripartite scheme of causation see F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius,* vol. 3 (Oxford, 1979), 208 (on 22.18.6).

2. Polyb. 3.6–7, 3.9.6–15.13, 22.18. On the translation of Polyb. 3.6.7 (concerning αἰτίαι) see F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley, 1972), 158–59; cf. A. M. Eckstein, "Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3.15 and the Power of Irrationality," *CP* 84 (1989): 1–15.

3. Polyb. 3.6.1–3, 3.7.1–3, 3.9.6–15.13. However, in explaining the origins of the Third Macedonian War, while Polybius (22.18) attributed the beginnings and the causes to Macedonia, his pretexts are Roman

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only. In the case of the Third Punic War, Polybius declared that the Romans sought an attractive pretext (πρόφασις) for a war against Carthage (36.2), and he promised (at 3.5.5) to explain the real motives (αἰτίαι) for their decision. Therefore he probably ascribed the beginning as well as the pretext and the cause of that conflict to them.

In 149, the Roman consuls crossed to Sicily with their army. This action must have constituted the beginning of the war in Polybius' scheme, for the Carthaginians promptly surrendered when they learned that the Romans had declared war and taken that step.[4]

At 36.2, referring to a senatorial debate held at the end of the consular year 150, Polybius says that the Romans had already decided long ago to declare war on Carthage, but were still searching for an attractive pretext (πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα). He means an outwardly presentable excuse, a professed reason as opposed to a genuine motive. A pretext (πρόφασις) is likely to be a feeble justification (3.6.13), a clumsy invention (3.15.4–11), or an unreasonable and false claim (3.7.3). Polybius (36.2), to be sure, indicates that the Romans carefully sought a means of justifying their decision that would conciliate public opinion. But since every pretext, even one that invokes honor and morality, is by nature a diversionary artifice, it must be judged by the criterion of expediency, not of morality. Only genuine motives may be judged on the basis of morality. That Polybius is talking about expediency at 36.2, not morality, is clear from his approving citation of Demetrius of Phalerum in the same passage. Demetrius, in recommending that states appear to enter wars with justice on their side, noted that there are many practical advantages to be gained when the inception of a war appears to be just (ἔνστασις γὰρ πολέμου . . . δικαία μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦσα . . .). The word δοκοῦσα shows that appearances, not genuine motives, are at issue here. Polybius, who says that the Romans were always very careful about such matters, believed that on this occasion they did proceed in a manner consistent with the precepts of Demetrius. In conjunction with πρόφασιν, at 36.2 the word εὐσχήμων means "attractive, decorous, specious, presentable."[5]

Roman (cf. Livy 42.40.5–9; *RDGE* 40; see further references in Walbank, *Historical Commentary*, 3:205–9 [on 22.18], 3:300 [on 27.6.3]). Usually in Polybius' system of causation, one side alone takes the decision to fight a war. The historian's attribution of the pretexts to Rome in this case perhaps betrays the inadequacy of his system in this respect (see Walbank, *Polybius*, 160–61).

4. Polyb. 36.3.9, 36.4.6, 36.5.6–6.1.

5. The statement of Demetrius reported at Polyb. 36.2.3 probably occurred in a work entitled *Strategica* (see Fritz Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, vol. 4: *Demetrios von Phaleron*^{2} [Basel, 1968], frag. 124 and pp. 70–71; Walbank, *Historical Commentary*, 3:655). The provenance of the citation (a book about military strategy) further suggests that the philosopher was discussing a diplomatic weapon, not morality. Polybius usually employs the word εὐσχήμων to express a moral judgment. At 3.40.13, 4.51.9, 5.75.6, and 28.7.12, it means "honorable" (cf. 10.18.7, where εὐσχημοσύνη means "honor"). The same is true at 4.12.10, 4.19.8, 5.110.11, and 21.10.5–6, where the word conveys a moral judgment (honorable, not honorable) in contrast with terms that imply a practical evaluation (profitable, safe, not possible). I am not persuaded by J.-L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate* (Rome, 1988), p. 297, n. 102, who states that in Polybius εὐσχήμων always means "honorable." At 24.13.8, the word appears to represent a practical

A reflection of Polybius 36.2 appears in Diodorus 32.5. While Polybius says that the Romans always sought to enter wars armed with attractive pretexts, Diodorus affirms that they always strove to embark upon wars that were just. Although Diodorus 32 is based primarily on Polybius,[6] the fragment 32.5 does not accurately represent him. On the contrary, that passage illustrates Diodorus' propensity for moralizing improvement.[7]

Although the surviving text of Polybius does not identify the Roman pretext, the latter may be reconstructed through comparison with the account of Appian (*Pun.* 67–135), which incorporates Polybian material. Usually Appian's account is consistent with what remains of Polybius 36 and 38, but since there are some important differences between the two authors, the relationship of Appian to his predecessor is not one of simple dependence. Appian does, however, stress the Romans' protracted search for a pretext after resolving in principle to fight a war. This emphasis suggests that his discussion of the pretext (*Pun.* 69 [314], 74 [338–46]) was based primarily on Polybius.[8]

According to Appian *Punica* 69 (314), the Roman senate resolved in 152 upon a war against Carthage, after Cato and his fellow envoys returned from their embassy to North Africa. However, they concealed their decision because they still needed pretexts (προφάσεις). Appian identified the

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evaluation, in contrast with καλή, signifying a moral judgment. The policy of Philopoemen is described as καλή (24.13.8), ἐνδοξοτέρα, and καλλίων (24.9.7), its supporters as τοὺς . . . κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ἱσταμένους (24.10.4). The policies of Philopoemen and Aristaenus, distinguished by Polybius as καλή and εὐσχήμων respectively (24.13.8), are also differentiated by Aristaenus as pursuing τὸ καλόν and τὸ συμφέρον (24.12.2–4). Polybius declares at 24.11.5 that the policy of Aristaenus was based on appearances (the semblance of respect for Achaean laws). The foregoing observations show that, in Polyb. 24.13.8, the word εὐσχήμων means "presentable," while καλή means "honorable." The *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* lists 53 occurrences of the word πρόφασις in Polybius. In one case it means "plea" (16.17.8), in eight cases "reason" (e.g., 4.5.2, 15.25.8), while in the remaining forty-four instances it means "pretext," in the sense of a professed reason as opposed to a genuine motive (e.g., 3.6.13, 3.7.3, 3.15.9, 4.5.8, 32.16.3, fragment 212 [Buettner-Wobst]).

6. Eduard Schwartz, "Diodorus (38)," *RE* 5.1 (1903): 689–90; Ulrich Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager von 218–146* (Berlin, 1913), 628–29; Filippo Càssola, "Diodoro e la storia romana," in *ANRW,* vol. 2.30.1 (1982), 763. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme,* 334–41, and K. S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton, 1990), 44–46, 137–38, deny that Diod. 32.2 and 32.4 are Polybian, but their arguments appear unpersuasive to me. The Polybian origin of the fragments is suggested by close verbal parallels between them and two Polybian passages (5.10.1–5, 36.9.3–4): see Paul Pédech, *La méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris, 1964), 201–2.

7. See Robert Drews, "Diodorus and his Sources," *AJP* 83 (1962): 383–92; cf. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus,* 121–27 (where 32.5 is not discussed, even though it illustrates Sacks' view that Diodorus himself occasionally expresses admiration for Rome).

8. According to Eduard Schwartz, "Appianus (2)," *RE* 2.1 (1895): 219–22, App. *Pun.* 67–135 is based on a Roman annalist of the mid-first century (not Valerius Antias) who used Polybius as well as earlier annalists. This view is accepted by Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager,* 620, 624–28; A. E. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford, 1967), 5; Walbank, *Historical Commentary,* 3:656. Ernst Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.)* (Oxford, 1958), 131, who admits the possibility of an intermediary source, believes that Appian's account is essentially Polybian. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme,* p. 321, n. 186, p. 323, n. 191, argues that Appian's intermediary source cannot be annalistic, for his account does not portray Rome in a favorable light. István Hahn, "Appian und seine Quellen," in *Romanitas-Christianitas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Literatur der römischen Kaiserzeit,* ed. Gerhardt Wirth (Berlin, 1982), 271–75, thinks that Appian's fundamental source may have been Polybius himself. Although Diod. 32.1 and 32.3 are based on Polybius (see note 6 above), comparison of these fragments with App. *Pun.* 74 (339–46) suggests that they are a muddled version of what Polybius himself wrote (cf. Walbank, *Historical Commentary,* 3:655–56).

main element of the Roman pretext as the Carthaginian-Numidian War of 150 (narrated in *Pun.* 70–73).[9] After their army suffered defeat and annihilation at the hands of the Numidians, the Carthaginians were afraid of the Romans, who (they thought) would treat the recent war as a pretext (πρόφασις) for attacking them. Their fears were justified, declares Appian, for the Romans immediately began to enrol an army. In an effort to dissolve the pretext (πρόφασις), the Carthaginians condemned to death their general Hasdrubal and other military commanders involved in the recent war. Then they sent envoys to Rome (still in 150). These men, admitted to the senate, blamed the condemned military leaders for the Carthaginian-Numidian War, and asked how the Carthaginians might clear themselves of any charge. The senate replied that they must give satisfaction to Rome. Perplexed by this enigmatic response, the Carthaginians sent another embassy (also in 150) to ask the senate to define "satisfaction." The *Patres* answered that the Carthaginians knew quite well what this meant (cf. Polyb. 36.3.1). By uttering opaque sentences, the senate prevented an expeditious resolution of their differences with Carthage. Appian observes that the senate replied in this way because they had long ago resolved to fight a war against Carthage, and were merely looking for trifling pretexts (προφάσεις ἐρεσχηλοῦσα). He means that, far from wanting to resolve the crisis, the Romans were anxious to maintain it. They had already resolved to fight; they had secured a pretext in the form of the Carthaginian-Numidian War; they maintained it while continuing to search for others (App. *Pun.* 74 [338–46]; cf. 79 [368–69]).

Both Appian and Polybius indicate that the Romans were looking for a pretext in the consular year 150, after the Carthaginian-Numidian War. Appian observes that they were still searching when the Punic embassies visited Rome, and Polybius implies that they continued to do so until the end of the year. It is therefore evident that neither historian regarded the Carthaginian-Numidian conflict by itself as the full pretext employed by Rome in the Third Punic War. Its principal element must, of course, be the earlier conflict (which Polybius described in a lost portion of Book 35: cf. 3.5.1), but the senate evidently seized upon some additional complaint when they finally decided that an adequate pretext existed (Polyb. 36.2).

What did Polybius regard as the full Roman pretext for declaring war on Carthage? From Appian (*Pun.* 75 [347–48]), we learn that Rome took this step after the surrender of Utica in 149 (cf. Polyb. 36.3.9). The latter event played no part in bringing about the Roman decision to fight a war against Carthage, for that resolution had already been taken in 152. Nor did it have any effect on the timing of the war. Since the Romans normally undertook military campaigns at the beginning of the consular year, the real decision to fight Carthage in 149 was taken in 150. The question of declaring war

9. On the date of the Carthaginian-Numidian War (spring-summer 150), see Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager,* p. 639, n. 1. On the events leading to the Third Punic War see Walbank, *Historical Commentary,* 3:653–54; Werner Huss, *Geschichte der Karthager* (Munich, 1985), 429–35; W. V. Harris, "Roman Expansion in the West," in *The Cambridge Ancient History*^{2}, vol. 8, ed. A. E. Astin et al. (Cambridge, 1989), 142–52.

was formally posed to the senate by the new consuls of 149, who acted in accordance with a senatorial resolution of the previous year. The *senatus consultum* mentioned by Livy in *Periochae* 48 (end), dated to the consular year 151 and vitiated by annalistic fabrication (see note 16 below), may preserve a trace of that decree.[10] Thus the full pretext invoked by the senate must have been agreed upon by late in the consular year 150. Although the senate was still at that time deeply divided on the issue, the majority finally settled upon a pretext (Polyb. 36.2). This, I suggest, was the Carthaginian-Numidian War (stressed by Appian), compounded by the failure of the Carthaginians to surrender in the consular year 150. On two occasions in that year, the senate had faintly intimated to their ambassadors the desirability of offering *deditio* to Rome (App. *Pun.* 74 [338–46]). According to Polybius 36.3.1–5, by the beginning of the consular year 149 the Carthaginians had already decided to surrender, thinking they could ingratiate themselves in this way, but were forestalled by the *deditio* of Utica. Thus, by the end of the consular year 150, the Romans might further accuse them of hostile intransigence.

The Roman-Punic *foedus* of 201 had forbidden Carthage to wage war inside its own territory without Roman consent, or to do so at all outside its boundaries (Polyb. 15.18.4). Thus in 150 the Carthaginians violated the terms of their treaty by fighting Numidia.

This transgression is noted by several major sources. Diodorus (32.1), whose work is based primarily on Polybius,[11] says that the Punic war against Massinissa was considered a violation of the treaty. Livy (*Per.* 48 [end]) and apparently Dio (Zonar. 9.26.1–2) concur. That the Carthaginian war against Numidia was considered a violation of the Roman-Punic treaty is noted by Polybius (represented by Diodorus) and by the Roman annalists (represented by Livy and Dio).

In two other passages concerning the Third Punic War, the Carthaginians are accused by Romans of treaty-breaking. According to Appian *Punica* 88 (416), the consul L. Marcius Censorinus, when ordering the Carthaginians to abandon their city, accused them of having repeatedly violated their treaties with Rome. Polybius (36.9.16) relates that Roman partisans in Greece said the Romans accused the Carthaginians of having broken their treaty. The violations mentioned by Appian and Polybius must refer (at least in part) to the Carthaginian-Numidian War. Thus in Polybius' view the Roman pretext (identified from the text of Appian) included a charge that the Carthaginians had been guilty of treaty-breaking.

Polybius (as I have argued) viewed the latter conflict as the main element of the Roman pretext for declaring war on Carthage in 149. On the contrary, Livy (*Per.* 48 [end], 49 [beginning]) and apparently Dio (Zonar. 9.26.1–2) represented the former as the cause of the latter war, not as a mere pretext. Their agreement on this point can be explained by the de-

10. See J. W. Rich, *Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion* (Brussels, 1976), 46–48.

11. See note 6 above.

pendence of Dio on Livy, who followed the Roman annalists on the causes of the Third Punic War.[12] Cato the Elder was probably influential in forming the later annalistic tradition. Since the Censor catalogued Punic treaty-violations, he is likely to have cited the Carthaginian-Numidian War in his screed of Punic perfidies.[13] For him, that violation must have been the cause of the ensuing war between Rome and Carthage. What he wrote in the *Origines* found its way through the later annalists into the pages of Livy and Dio.[14]

Since (as I have argued) Polybius regarded the Carthaginian-Numidian conflict only as part of the Roman pretext for the Third Punic War, what did he identify as the true cause (αἰτία)? The clearest indication of his thinking on this point appears at 3.5.5, where he says that the Romans "laid their hands on the Carthaginians" (Καρχηδονίοις ἐπέβαλον τὰς χεῖρας). This phrase suggests that he regarded the Roman decision to fight Carthage as prompted by aggressive motives. The same phrase occurs in fragment 99 (Buettner-Wobst) of Polybius, where it is associated with aggression. The passage reads: "For the Romans took no slight care not manifestly to begin an unjust attack (τοῦ μὴ κατάρχοντες φαίνεσθαι χειρῶν ἀδίκων) or to commit aggression against their neighbors (τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν τοῖς πέλας) when undertaking wars, but rather always to seem to enter upon wars in self-defence and under compulsion." Committing aggression against one's neighbors is contrasted with acting in self-defense; the Romans assiduously avoided the appearance of the first while creating the semblance of the second kind of behavior. The expressions ἐπιβαλεῖν . . . τὰς χεῖρας (32.16.3) and τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν (27.4.5) both refer to an unprovoked attack. The phrase τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν occurs again at 3.2.8, where it refers to the attack made by Philip V and Antiochus III on the Ptolemaic kingdom after 203/2. Elsewhere (15.20.3–4) Polybius censured the kings for their shameful and greedy conduct, justified by not so much as a tenuous pretext (βραχεῖαν . . . πρόφασιν). He condemned the Romans themselves for declaring war on Carthage in 238, when they had no reasonable (εὔλογος) pretext (πρόφασις) or cause (αἰτία) for their action (3.28.1). At

12. According to Eduard Schwartz, "Cassius Dio Cocceianus (40)," *RE* 3.2 (1899): 1696–97, in Books 18–21 Dio used a Roman annalistic source that incorporated earlier annalists and Polybius. This view is accepted by Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager,* 623, 629–35. Arthur Rosenberg, *Einleitung und Quellenkunde zur römischen Geschichte* (Berlin, 1921), 260, believed that Dio himself consulted earlier annalists and Polybius. I find more plausible the view that Dio's chief source was Livy (see Heinrich Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius* [Berlin, 1863], 308–12). In his treatment of the Third Punic War and its precedents, Livy (Books 47–51) probably used Roman annalists (Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius) as well as Polybius (see Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager,* 621–23, 635–37; Badian, *Foreign Clientelae,* 131–32; P. G. Walsh, *Livy,* Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics, no. 8 [Oxford, 1974], 16). Florus 1.31.3 and Ampelius *Liber Memoralis* 46.6 agree with Livy because their work was based on an abridgment of his *Ab urbe condita libri* (see Luigi Bessone, "La tradizione epitomatoria liviana in età imperiale," in *ANRW,* vol. 2.30.2 [1982], p. 1235, n. 24 [Florus], p. 1238, n. 35 [Ampelius]).

13. See B. D. Hoyos, "Cato's Punic Perfidies," *AHB* 1 (1987): 112–21; cf. idem, "Cato's 'Duovicesimo Anno' and Punic Treaty-Breaches in the 230s B.C.," *AHB* 4 (1990): 31–36. Also see note 22 below.

14. See Hermann Tränkle, "Cato in der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius," *AAWM* (1971, no. 4): 111–37; T. J. Luce, *Livy: The Composition of his History* (Princeton, 1977), 163–65. It is also possible that Livy himself consulted the *Origines* and Cato's speech *De Bello Carthaginiensi* in composing Books 47–50.

3.5.5, then, Polybius seems to represent the Romans as the perpetrators of aggression.

This judgment agrees with 36.2, where Polybius says that the Romans proclaimed an attractive excuse. A close reading of fragment 99 reveals that, for Polybius, posing as victim does not negate underlying aggression, but merely conceals it. At 36.2 the historian recommends only that states embarking upon wars should appear to be acting justly; they should offer a presentable justification, even if it is not the real motive for their enterprise. A nation that claims to be acting in self-defense may in fact be pursuing aggressive aims. Thus Polybius' judgment at 3.5.5 is a realistic estimate of Roman conduct.

Polybius condemned the two kings for their assault on Egypt (15.20.3–4) and praised the Romans for the diplomatic preparations that they made prior to the Third Punic War (36.2), even though all parties in his view committed aggression. His judgment of these events reveals something important about the way in which he assessed the behavior of powerful states. For Polybius, aggression in itself was not immoral. On the contrary, he generally considered imperialist expansion to be laudable, glorious, and beautiful.[15] Condemnation was appropriate only when the aggressor could not cite a specious excuse invoking justice. If the aggressor adduced a specious justification, an observer could believe that adequate grounds for war at least existed, even though the aggressor was not really acting for the reasons put forward. But if no presentable warrant could be advanced, the same action would appear to be totally indefensible.

What were the aggressive motives attributed by Polybius to Rome? His promise (at 3.5.5) to reveal the causes (αἰτίαι) of the Third Punic War was fulfilled in a portion of the *Histories* that is no longer extant. Certain explanations may be ruled out. As noted earlier, both Livy and Dio represented the Carthaginian-Numidian War of 150 as the cause of the Third Punic War, an interpretation that probably goes back through the Roman annalists to Cato the Elder. Polybius, on the contrary, viewed the same event only as part of the pretext.

The Roman annalistic tradition also accumulated a list of grievances exhibiting the lengthy forbearance of Rome and the mounting guilt of Carthage. Livy (*Per.* 48) records the arrival of an enormous Numidian army (presumably cavalry) at Carthage, evidence of military shipbuilding, violence threatened against Roman envoys, a Punic resolve to fight a war against Rome, a Roman ultimatum disregarded. In *Periochae* 49 (beginning), he cites military shipbuilding and an affront offered to Gulussa, the son of Massinissa, as charges publicly invoked by the Romans in their official declaration of war against Carthage. Most of these allegations are probably confections originating either with contemporary Romans or

15. Polyb. 3.6.12, 6.50, 8.10.6, 38.2.6–10, 38.3.5–7.

with annalistic historians.[16] At any rate, their defensive tenor is at variance with the essential outlook of Polybius (3.5.5).

The patriotic efforts of the Roman annalists resulted in a distortion of chronology observable in the work of Livy. According to *Periochae* 49 (beginning), the Roman historian believed that the Third Punic War was finished within five years ("Tertii Punici belli initium . . . intra quintum annum, quam erat coeptum, consummati"). As the war ended in the consular year 146, the fifth year (by inclusive reckoning) implies a starting point in 150; and that indeed is where Livy places the Roman declaration of war, immediately after the defeat of Carthage by Massinissa in that year. Livy seems to think that 149 began with the siege of Carthage by the new consuls L. Marcius Censorinus and M. Manilius. He is wrong, for in fact it began with the Roman declaration of war (cf. Polyb. 36.3–7). Livy assigned the latter event to 150 so that the Romans might appear to have fulfilled without delay their threat to declare war, supposedly made in 151 (Livy *Per.* 48 [end]: "placuit, ut bello abstinerent, si Carthaginienses classem exussissent et exercitum dimisissent; si minus, proximi consules [i.e., in 150] de bello Punico referrent").[17]

Apparently Dio's account (Zonar. 9.26.1–3) contained a variety of annalistic features shared with Livy. Both he and the Latin author regarded the Carthaginian-Numidian conflict as the cause of the Third Punic War. He as well as Livy drew attention to a Punic military fleet; he too mentioned a Roman ultimatum on disarmament (dated to 152 rather than 151), which the Carthaginians (supposedly) ignored when they fought against Numidia in 150; he too implied that the Romans immediately declared war on Carthage (presumably in 150).[18] Neither Livy nor Dio mentioned the two embassies dispatched by the Carthaginians to Rome in 150 after their defeat by Massinissa, for an account of those embassies might have suggested that the Romans were unwilling to make peace with a repentant Carthage (cf. App. *Pun.* 74 [338–46]). To sum up, the explanations of the Third Punic War offered by the annalists are both untrustworthy and quite different from those of Polybius.

Now Polybius' own identification of causes may be explored. Plutarch (*Cat. Mai.* 26–27) and Appian (*Pun.* 69 [310–15]) agree that the Romans declared war on Carthage because they were convinced by the arguments of Cato. After returning from his embassy to North Africa in 152, the unrelenting scold kept telling the senate that, because of its numerous population, its wealth and military equipment, its pride and inveterate hostility, Carthage posed a threat to Rome's very existence. The old enemy, he

16. See Badian, *Foreign Clientelae,* 130–34; Pédech, *Méthode historique,* p. 197, n. 492; Rich, *Declaring War,* 99–101; W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C.* (Oxford, 1979), 234–35.

17. Livy (*Per.* 49 [beginning]) places the surrender of Utica after the Roman declaration of war, thus reversing the correct order as reported by Appian (*Pun.* 75 [347–48]) and implied by Polybius (36.3.9). His version makes the Romans appear less opportunistic than they actually were.

18. Apparently Dio also represented the Carthaginian surrender of 149 as insincere (Zonar. 9.26.3).

declared, would eventually make war on Rome. Therefore he kept demanding that Carthage be destroyed. Plutarch says that Cato's arguments induced the Romans to declare war in 149, while Appian relates that they persuaded the *Patres* immediately (i.e., in 152) to resolve upon fighting Carthage as soon as suitable pretexts could be found. Appian's chronology accords better with that of Polybius, who at 36.2 implies that, by the end of the consular year 150, the Romans had already decided long ago to fight Carthage at some future date.

The accounts of Plutarch and Appian are quite similar, though Appian is shorter and less detailed than Plutarch. Probably both go back (ultimately at least) to Polybius. Appian's work on the Third Punic War incorporated Polybian material, directly or indirectly,[19] and Plutarch made some use of him in the *Cato Maior*.[20] There are striking verbal and conceptual parallels between Plutarch *Cato Maior* 26–27 and Polybius 36.9.4 that further suggest the dependence of Plutarch on the Achaean historian.[21]

The annalistic tradition represented by Livy (*Per.* 48–49) is consistent with what is found in Plutarch and Appian. According to Livy, Cato on two occasions in 152 called for a war against the Carthaginians on the grounds that they were preparing to attack Rome. He repeated his demand in 151 and again in 149, whereupon the senate finally voted to declare war.

There is no reason to doubt that Cato actually did urge his compatriots to fight and destroy Carthage on the grounds that the old enemy intended to attack them. In his oration *De Bello Carthaginiensi,* pronounced at the beginning of 149, prior to the Roman declaration of war, Cato said: "The Carthaginians are already our enemies; for the man who prepares everything against me, so that he can make war whenever he wants, is already my enemy, even though he is not yet taking military action" (*ORF*^{2}, pp. 78–79, frag. 195).[22]

Because Plutarch and Appian say that the Romans declared war on Carthage persuaded by Cato's arguments, it is likely that Polybius had said

19. See note 8 above and related text.

20. Plutarch cites Polybius at *Cato Maior* 10.3. For discussion see Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen,* 292–98; Hermann Peter, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Biographieen der Römer* (Halle, 1865), 91–93; Dietmar Kienast, *Cato der Zensor* (Heidelberg, 1954), 10; Robert Flacelière and Émile Chambry, eds., *Plutarque: Vies, Tome 5* (Paris, 1969), 56–61; A. E. Astin, *Cato the Censor* (Oxford, 1978), 295–301; Barbara Scardigli, *Die Römerbiographien Plutarchs: Ein Forschungsbericht* (Munich, 1979), 45.

21. The following parallels may be observed: Plut. τοῦ πολέμου . . . καιρὸν περιμένοντος (26.4) and Polyb. (sc. Carthage) ἔτι δὲ καὶ νῦν δυναμένην ἀμφισβητῆσαι σὺν καιρῷ (36.9.4); Plut. τὸν φόβον . . . ἐπικεῖσθαι (27.3), πόλιν . . . ἐπικρέμασθαι (27.4), τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀνελεῖν τῆς ἡγεμονίας φόβους (27.4) and Polyb. τὸν ἐπικρεμάμενον φόβον καὶ τὴν πολλάκις μὲν ἠμφισβητηκυῖαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πόλιν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας . . . ταύτην ἐπανελομένους (36.9.4). Harris, *War and Imperialism,* 271, denies that such similarities are enough to establish the dependence of Plutarch on Polybius. It could be argued that they result from use of a common source such as Cato's speech *De Bello Carthaginiensi* (on which see note 22 below) or his *Origines* (which included some of his speeches: cf. Livy 45.25.2–3). On Plutarch's knowledge of the *Origines* see *Cat. Mai.* 10.3, 14.2, 25.1. Plutarch might have read such material in the original Latin or in a Greek translation, possibly in the form of a summary prepared by an assistant (see Flacelière and Chambry, *Plutarque,* 56–59; C. B. R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives," *JHS* 99 [1979]: 74–96, esp. 83–91).

22. This must be the speech that Cato made at the beginning of the consular year 149, before the Romans declared war on Carthage (cf. Livy *Per.* 49 [beginning]). The argument of *ORF*^{2}, pp. 78–79, frag. 195, presupposes that war has not yet been declared. Giuseppe Nenci, "La *De Bello Carthaginiensi* di Catone Censore," *CS* 1 (1962): 363–68, has reclaimed another fragment of this speech (*Rhet. Her.* 4.14.20;

this.[23] If he did, he appears at first sight to have contradicted himself, for at 3.5.5 he declares that Rome committed aggression against Carthage, while Plutarch (*Cat. Mai.* 26–27) and Appian (*Pun.* 69 [310–15]) suggest that in Book 36 he portrayed the Romans as acting in self-defence. However, the contradiction is only apparent. Although he refrained from recording the separate speeches made by leading Romans in 150/49 on the subject of war against Carthage, Polybius did report the most vital and effective arguments employed by the various speakers (36.1). His summary of the debate must have included Cato's contribution. It is therefore likely that Polybius thought the Romans were persuaded by him. But which arguments of Cato did Polybius regard as most effective in convincing the Romans?

Plutarch, Appian, and the annalistic tradition emphasized Cato's warning about a Punic threat to Rome's very existence. Some scholars believe that Polybius too thought the Romans were convinced by this argument, which they identify as the Polybian αἰτία.[24] But Polybius is unlikely to have treated that argument as persuasive to the Romans, whom he viewed as aggressors (see 3.5.5). Plutarch preserves traces of two other Catonian arguments, both fundamentally aggressive in character, that Polybius probably did consider effective in leading the Romans to declare war.

First, Cato resented the fact that the Romans had not completely eradicated the external threat posed to their empire by Carthage (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27.4). This argument is echoed at Polybius 36.9.3–4, where the historian says that Roman partisans in Greece applauded the order that the Carthaginians should destroy their city and rebuild inland. By issuing this command, they argued, the Romans had acted wisely as concerns their empire, for they had done away with a city that might challenge their domination, and had thereby secured the rule of their own country.[25] An

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Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.31), in which Cato says: "Who are the people who have often broken their treaties? The Carthaginians. Who are the people who have waged war with the utmost cruelty? The Carthaginians. Who are the people who have disfigured Italy? The Carthaginians. Who are the people who ask to be forgiven? The Carthaginians." Nenci connected the Carthaginians' request for pardon with their surrender of 149, which followed the Roman declaration of war (though for some reason he explicitly dated the speech in 150). Enrica Malcovati, "Sull' orazione di Catone *de Bello Carthaginiensi*," *Athenaeum* 53 (1975): 205–11, now accepts this fragment (cf. Malcovati, "Review of Gualtiero Calboli, *Marci Porci Catonis Oratio pro Rhodiensibus*," in *Athenaeum* 56 [1978]: 379–80), and agrees with Nenci about the context of the speech. But the oration must precede the Roman declaration of war, and the Punic request for pardon may be connected with the two embassies sent by Carthage to Rome in 150 (App. *Pun.* 74 [338–46]). Two other reasons for accepting Nenci's fragment are the stress on treaty-breaking, which is characteristic of Cato (see Hoyos, "Cato's Punic Perfidies," 112–21) and the rhetorical structure of the passage, which recalls that of Cato *Agr.* 61.1: "Quid est agrum bene colere? bene arare. Quid secundum? arare. Quid tertium? stercorare." Bibliography on the date of Cato's speech may be found in Astin, *Cato the Censor*, p. 128, n. 72.

23. Cf. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme*, 321.

24. Thus Pédech, *Methode historique*, 196–97; Ferrary, *Philhellénisme*, 321.

25. The opinions reported by Polybius in 36.9 are concerned specifically with the Roman treatment of Carthage after the Punic *deditio* of 149. According to the first opinion, the Romans acted intelligently when they destroyed Carthage (36.9.3–4). This action refers to the Roman decision to make the Carthaginians destroy their city and found a new one inland. This is clear from the second, third, and fourth opinions. The second criticizes the Roman judgment regarding Carthage (τῆς περὶ Καρχηδονίων διαλήψεως) and accuses the Romans of taking a harsh decision (βαρέως βεβουλεῦσθαι) against the enemy even though they had

allusion to Cato's argument also occurs in Appian *Punica* 134 (633). Describing the scene of rejoicing at Rome upon the fall of Carthage in 146, Appian explains that the population felt relieved of great fears, and able just now to rule others firmly (ἄρτι δ' ἄρχοντες ἑτέρων ἀσφαλῶς) while establishing the security of their own city. These points reflect Cato's arguments as reported by Plutarch (*Cat. Mai.* 26–27) and by Appian himself (*Pun.* 69 [310–15]). In particular, the second item recalls Cato's warning (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27.4) about a threat to Roman domination. Cato's argument, reported by Plutarch and echoed in Polybius and Appian, was derived ultimately from the speech *De Bello Carthaginiensi* (see note 21 above). Polybius must have recorded this point in his summary of Cato's oration (cf. 36.1).

When Polybius wanted to represent the views held by Roman partisans in Greece, he cited the argument that Carthage posed a threat to the Roman empire (36.9.3–4). The claim that Carthage threatened Rome's very existence he did not consider worth mentioning. He is therefore likely to have believed that the former, not the latter, argument carried weight with the Romans.

In what precedes, I have suggested that Polybius is likely to have considered Cato's argument based on defence of the empire as fundamentally aggressive in nature. Since he viewed the Roman empire as the product of an aggressive drive,[26] he probably regarded defence of their supremacy as enlargement of the original aggression. This appears to be true, at any rate, in the case of the Aetolian War of 192–89. In his summary of Books 3–29, covering the years 220–168, Polybius (3.2–3) declares that study of the principal events narrated there will demonstrate how the Romans made the world subject to themselves. One of these events is the Aetolian War, in which the Romans prevented their opponents from overthrowing their recent settlement of Greece.[27]

I think that Polybius was right to stress Cato's argument for war based on defense of Roman power in North Africa. Although some modern historians believe that the Romans declared war in response to a Punic threat, real or imagined, to their very existence,[28] I find more persuasive

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agreed to accept every Roman demand (36.9.7–8). The third and fourth opinions deal strictly with Roman conduct and demands following the Punic surrender (see esp. 36.9.10, 36.9.12–13).

26. Polybius represented the growth of Roman domination as the product of a conscious drive (1.6, 1.10.5–9, 1.12.7, 1.20.1–2, 2.21.9, 2.31.8, 3.3.9, 3.32.7, 6.50.6). He says they deliberately set out to acquire universal dominion (1.3.6–10, 1.63.4–9, 3.2.6, 8.1.3, 9.10.11, 15.9.2, 15.10.2), an aim definitely achieved by 168 (1.1.5, 3.3.9, 3.4.2–3). On Polybius' views about Rome's universal empire see Walbank, *Polybius,* 160–63. A somewhat different interpretation is presented by P. S. Derow, "Polybius, Rome, and the East," *JRS* 69 (1979): 2–4.

27. Polyb. 3.3.3, 3.7.1–2, 18.38.1–39.2, 18.45.

28. Matthias Gelzer, "Nasicas Widerspruch gegen die Zerstörung Karthagos," *Philologus* 86 (1931): 296–99; F. E. Adcock, "Delenda est Carthago," *CHJ* 8 (1944–46): 117–28 (Roman fear was unfounded); P. G. Walsh, "Massinissa," *JRS* 55 (1965): 149–60; Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus,* 48–53, 270–80; Astin, *Cato the Censor,* 125–30, 283–88, 291–92; Sigrid Albert, *Bellum Iustum: Die Theorie des "Gerechten Krieges" und ihre praktische Bedeutung für die auswärtigen Auseinandersetzungen Roms in republikanischer Zeit* (Kallmunz, 1980), 50–55; Huss, *Geschichte der Karthager,* 435–39; Ursula Vogel-Weidemann, "Carthago delenda est: *Aitia* and *Prophasis,*" *AClass* 32 (1989): 79–95 (the Romans feared the possibility of expansion by Massinissa's eventual successors); M. G. Morgan, "The Perils of Schematism: Polybius, Antiochus Epiphanes and the 'Day of Eleusis,'" *Historia* 39 (1990): 40–45, 72–76.

the view that the Romans took their decision because they correctly assessed the true nature of the threat, that is, the Punic capacity to discomfit their control of North Africa.[29]

Several observations would have led the Romans to conclude in the years 153–49 that Carthage might disdain submission. In 153, when Rome was distracted by a Spanish war, the Carthaginians had attacked some Numidians on disputed territory (App. *Pun.* 68 [306–7]). In 152, they rejected Roman intervention in the latest round of trouble with Massinissa. Cato himself had led the embassy appointed by the senate to arbitrate in this affair (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 26; App. *Pun.* 69 [310–12]). The expiry in 151 of the war-indemnity owed by Carthage to Rome since 200 (cf. 15.18.7) would place additional resources at the disposal of a city regaining a measure of confidence. Carthage began preparing for a war against Numidia (Livy *Per.* 48), the result being the conflict of 150 (App. *Pun.* 70–73), which involved a transgression of the Roman-Punic treaty of 201 (cf. 15.18.4).

Cato employed a second argument that Polybius is likely to have regarded as effective in persuading the Romans to declare war. At some point after returning from North Africa in 152, he entertained his senatorial colleagues with a theatrical exhibition of African figs. According to Pliny the Elder (*HN* 15.20 [74–76]), Cato implied that the figs had been conveyed by sea from Africa to Rome within three days, emphasizing the proximity of hostile Carthage. In this version of the event, Cato depicted the Romans as victims of an impending attack. Plutarch's account of the same incident (*Cat. Mai.* 27.1) stresses another aspect of his performance. The scourge of Carthage said the country that had produced the figs was situated three days from Rome by sea. Although Plutarch omits to specify the direction of travel, Cato must be referring to the transportation of figs from Carthage to Rome. However, in Plutarch's account, Cato does not allude to an imminent Punic attack against Rome. At this point, the biographer mentions instead that the senators marvelled at the size and beauty of the figs. It would be naive to conclude that the *Patres* were innocently admiring the wonders of nature. These men were all wealthy landowners, investors of practical business sense who understood the commercial value of fruit. The African fig was being cultivated in Italy during the second century before Christ (Cato *Agr.* 8.1; cf. Varro *Rust.* 1.41.6). Plutarch's

29. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae,* 125–40; Wilhelm Hoffmann, "Die römische Politik des 2. Jahrhunderts und das Ende Karthagos," *Historia* 9 (1960): 313–15, 323–24, 330–39; Gaetano De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani,* vol. 4.3 (Florence, 1964), 16–23; Ernst Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971), 20; Jan Burian, "*Ceterum autem censeo Carthaginem esse delendam,*" *Klio* 60 (1978): 169–75; E. Maróti, "On the Causes of Carthage's Destruction," *Oikumene* 4 (1983): 223–31. According to App. *Pun.* 88 (416), the consul Censorinus, when demanding that the Carthaginians abandon their city, interpreted their desire to retain "such harbors and dockyards" as evidence that they hoped to recover their empire (the two harbors of Carthage are described at *Pun.* 96 and 127). Recent archaeological work at Carthage suggests that the circular (military) harbor was built in the first half of the second century: see Serge Lancel, "Les ports puniques de Carthage: État des questions," in *Actes du V^e colloque international sur l'histoire et l'archéologie de l'Afrique du Nord: Spectacles, Vie Portuaire, Religions* (Paris, 1992), 297–315. The construction of the military harbor is best regarded as evidence of regional ambitions. A survey of scholarly opinion on the causes of the Third Punic War is given by Filippo Càssola, "Tendenze filopuniche e antipuniche in Roma," in *Atti del I Congresso Internazionale di Studi Fenici e Punici,* vol. 1 (Rome, 1983), 47–50.

account suggests that our shrewd *latifondista* was not only warning his curial fellows about Carthaginian aggression but also appealing to the acquisitive instincts of his colleagues.

This conclusion is supported by the implications of an interesting study written by F. J. Meijer,[30] who demonstrates that the prevailing winds at harvest time in North Africa imposed a journey of at least six days by sea from Carthage to Rome, the reverse journey taking three days. The freshness of Cato's exhibits (this quality is mentioned only by Pliny) shows that the figs came not from North Africa but from his own Italian estates. No one in his audience was deceived about the provenance of his specimens (though Pliny and Plutarch carelessly or uncritically retailed what Cato said). Cato's reference to a three-day journey (reported by both authors) betrays who is supposed to be attacking whom. His colleagues perceived with grim delight the subtle point made by their mentor: Cato's African figs came from his own estate in Italy; the native soil of this fruit, within easy reach by sea, could be expropriated by Roman cultivators. It is likely that Cato reiterated this argument for war in his speech *De Bello Carthaginiensi,* and that Polybius in turn reported it in his summary of the oration (cf. 36.1).

Polybius says that victory and conquest are not ends in themselves, but means towards goals such as pleasure, good, or utility (3.4.9–11). Therefore he must have believed that Cato's argument influenced the Romans when they decided to fight Carthage. I therefore suggest that another cause of the Third Punic War in Polybius' scheme was a desire on the part of certain senators to annex Carthaginian soil and make it available for exploitation by members of their own economic class.[31]

A third aggressive motive may be suggested. Appian (*Pun.* 75 [351]) relates that the Romans, after declaring war on Carthage, easily mustered a large and effective army because citizens and allies hastened to join an illustrious expedition offering "a foreseeable hope" (προῦπτον ἐλπίδα). This detail probably comes from Polybius, who explained that in 264 οἱ πολλοί (probably the majority of senators) voted to support the Mamertines after the consuls had pointed out the obvious (προδήλους) and great benefits (ὠφελείας) to be secured privately by individuals in a Sicilian war against Carthage (1.11.2).[32] That Polybius did not regard booty as the exclusive concern of senators emerges from 1.20.1–2, suggesting that all sectors of the population were interested in spoils (cf. 1.20–21). The historian also affirmed that in the middle of the second century Carthage was

30. "Cato's African Figs," *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984): 117–24.

31. Several modern scholars have stressed economic considerations as leading motives for the Third Punic War. See, for example, Theodor Mommsen, *Histoire Romaine,* trans. C. A. Alexandre, vol. 1 (Paris, 1985), 723–24 (commercial rivalry); Adcock, "Delenda est Carthago," 119–20 (political and fiscal motives); M. I. Rostovtseff, *Histoire Économique et Sociale de l'Empire Romain,* trans. Odile Demange (Paris, 1988), 30 (economic motives); De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani,* 4.3:20–24 (economic and political motives); Harris, "Roman Expansion," 152–57, and idem, *War and Imperialism,* 234–40 (economic motives). I shall argue presently that 36.4.4–9 indicates Polybius could not have represented expropriation as a dominant motive of the senate as a whole.

32. A. M. Eckstein, "Polybius on the Rôle of the Senate in the Crisis of 264 B.C.," *GRBS* 21 (1980): 175–90, has argued that, in Polyb. 1.11.2, the words οἱ πολλοί refer not to the Roman masses but to the

regarded as the wealthiest city of the world (18.35.9). Thus the prospects of booty animating the enthusiasm of ordinary Romans in 149 had probably informed their decision to fight, and Polybius may have cited this factor among his causes.

Polybius could not have accorded the same weight to all three motives. The first of these, securing Roman domination in North Africa, must have been the most important for him. Cato had urged his compatriots to achieve this objective by declaring war and destroying the city of Carthage (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27.4). Even after the Carthaginians surrendered, the Romans ordered them to destroy their city (Polyb. 36.7). Partisans in Greece explained and justified this command as motivated by a desire to protect Roman domination (Polyb. 36.9.3–4). The destruction of Carthage was therefore a fixed aspect of Roman policy from the very outset of the war (cf. Polyb. 3.5.5), and the underlying motive, too, remained constant in Polybius' thinking.

It is, however, difficult to suppose that Polybius cited a desire to expropriate Carthaginian land as a decisive motive for the Roman declaration of war. After the Carthaginians surrendered in 149, the Romans promised not to assume direct ownership of their territory (Polyb. 36.4.4–9). At the time, Polybius himself had regarded the Punic *deditio* as marking the end of the war (36.11). Thus he did not believe that the Romans intended to provoke armed resistance. In his expanded version of the *Histories,* written after 146, Polybius declares that during the initial phase of the conflict the Romans planned to do no more than "displace" the enemy (3.5.5). Therefore, he always believed that the Romans would have kept their promise not to expropriate Carthaginian landowners had the enemy destroyed their city as Rome demanded.[33] Because Polybius thought that the Romans sincerely offered to forego expropriation after Carthage surrendered, he is unlikely to have viewed expropriation as a leading motive for their declaration of war, and his statement at 3.5.5 appears to rule out such an explanation.

Although the majority of senators did not support annexation and expropriation in 149, either before or after the Punic surrender, Cato and others voted for war in part because they hoped that it would lead to that result. It is for this reason that Cato, after the *deditio* of Carthage, opposed the granting of terms (Zonar. 9.26.4), which in the end included a promise not to despoil Punic landowners (Zonar. 9.26.4–5, Polyb. 36.4.4–9). Polybius therefore probably cited a desire to expropriate Carthaginian soil

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majority of senators. This interpretation is rejected by B. D. Hoyos, "Polybius' Roman οἱ πολλοί in 264 B.C.," *LCM* 9 (1984): 88–93. Although some of the arguments on both sides appear inconclusive to me, I think that Eckstein's translation is correct. The words οἱ πολλοί mean either "the majority" or "the masses." Since Polyb. 1.11.1–3 begins with an account of senatorial deliberations, if οἱ πολλοί means "the majority," then the majority of the senate, not of the assembly, must be signified. If οἱ πολλοί are "the masses," then in 1.11.3 the subject of ἐξαπέστειλαν will be "the masses" (understood); but this interpretation is inadmissible, for Polybius accurately ascribes formal constitutional powers to the assembly, which he calls ὁ δῆμος (1.11.3).

33. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme,* 322.

as a subsidiary cause of the war, of importance to some persons, but not the majority of senators.

That there is no evidence of any large-scale Roman ownership of Punic land until the foundation of the *colonia Iunonia* in 123 does not preclude an early interest in the exploitation of Carthaginian soil. At 18.35.9–11, Polybius declares that Scipio Aemilianus declined to augment his modest estate by taking anything from Carthage itself or from Punic territory in general. The abstinence of Scipio implies that other Romans had not hesitated to enrich themselves. The text of Polybius, which appears primarily to concern movable booty, does not absolutely exclude landed property. At any rate, the centuriation of the new province, which proceeded over a period of centuries, began soon after the conquest, before the foundation of the *colonia Iunonia* in 123. The inception of the survey after 146 indicates an early interest in settling Romans on African soil.[34]

The third cause involves booty. Polybius thought that the Romans, by accepting the surrender of Carthage, intended to avoid fighting in North Africa. He therefore believed that they renounced the opportunity for plunder. This, however, does not rule out the prospect of booty as a Roman motive for declaring war in his analysis of causes. The historian could have believed that the rank and file supported the war in part because they hoped for personal gain.

In fine, Polybius believed that Rome's decision was motivated by aggressive considerations. He judged the Romans to be ultimately responsible for the Third Punic War. Despite his relations with important Romans, despite his involvement in events on the Roman side, despite his admiration of the Roman empire, despite his general outlook, predominantly favorable to Rome, Polybius' intellectual integrity allowed him to portray Roman military action against Carthage as fundamentally aggressive in its motivation.[35] From the very beginning of the *Histories,* Polybius' general statements and detailed narrative assert the aggressive

34. The fundamental study remains Raymond Chevallier, "Essai de chronologie des centuriations romaines de Tunisie," *MEFR* 70 (1958): 61–128, esp. 65–78; cf. E. M. Wightman, "The Plan of Roman Carthage: Practicalities and Politics," in *New Light on Ancient Carthage,* ed. J. G. Pedley (Ann Arbor, 1980), 34–36; Andrew Lintott, *Judicial Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic: A New Edition, with Translation and Commentary, of the Laws from Urbino* (Cambridge, 1992), 47, 53–54. Further bibliography may be found in Pol Trousset, "Les bornes du Bled-Segui: Nouveaux aperçus sur la centuriation romaine du sud Tunisien," *AntAfr* 12 (1978): 125, n. 4; 126, n. 1; Jean Peyras, "Paysages agraires et centuriations dans le bassin de l'Oued Tine (Tunisie du Nord)," *AntAfr* 19 (1983): 224, n. 160. The *colonia Iunonia* was probably established in 123 (see David Stockton, *The Gracchi* [Oxford, 1979], p. 204, n. 69; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero*[5] [London, 1982], p. 389, n. 34; T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic,* vol. 3 [Atlanta, 1986], 182).

35. On Polybius' Roman bias see Arnaldo Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization* (Cambridge, 1975), 22–38, 36–48; F. W. Walbank, "Polybius' Last Ten Books," in *Historiographia Antiqua: Commentationes Lovanienses in honorem W. Peremans septuagenarii editae,* ed. Tony Reekmans et al. (Louvain, 1977), 159–61; idem, "Polibio nel Giudizio di Gaetano de Sanctis," *RFIC* 111 (1983): 467–77; Michel Dubuisson, *Le Latin de Polybe: Les implications historiques d'un cas de bilinguisme* (Paris, 1985), 279–87; Peter Green, *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley, 1990), 269–85.

character of Roman policy.[36] His explanation of the Third Punic War is therefore consistent with the judgment of events expressed throughout his work.[37] Although he admired the achievement of Rome, Polybius accurately identified the expansionistic impulse that made it possible.[38]

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36. Polybius regarded the Romans as an aggressive people who deliberately extended their power over others and formed the conscious goal of attaining universal dominion (see references in note 26 above). On the aggressive character of Roman policy in Polybius' view see Derow, "Polybius," pp. 1–15.

37. F. W. Walbank has argued that Polybius became a strong partisan of Rome after 152/1 (cf. Books 35–39): see F. W. Walbank, "Political Morality and the Friends of Scipio," *JRS* 55 (1965): 1–13; *Polybius,* 166–81; "Polybius between Greece and Rome," in *Polybe,* Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, vol. 20, ed. Emilio Gabba (Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1974), 11–27; "Polybius' Last Ten Books," 153–62; "Il Guidizio di Polibio su Roma," *AIV* 140 (1981–82): 242–56. Walbank overstates Polybius' Roman bias in Books 35–39. The ancient author, who exposed Rome's aggressive motives in the Third Punic War, consistently demonstrated such independence of thought throughout the Histories (see note 36 above). By including opinions hostile to Rome at 36.9.5–11, he expressed reservations about Roman policy: see Arnaldo Momigliano, "Polibio, Posidonio e l'imperialismo romano," *AAT* 107 (1972–73): 697–99; idem, *Alien Wisdom,* 29–36; Domenico Musti, *Polibio e l'imperialismo romano* (Naples, 1978), 54–57, 82–84, 145–47; Ferrary, *Philhellénisme,* 327–32. Throughout his work, Polybius censured Rome's enemies when they engaged in ill-advised and self-destructive conflict with the superior power instead of cooperating prudently in order to preserve as much independence as possible. His fundamental loyalty was to Achaea and to Greece: see Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom,* 48–49; Musti, *Polibio,* 44–48, 69–78; Binyamin Shimron, "Polybius on Rome: A Re-examination of the Evidence," *SCI* 5 (1979–80): 94–117; A. M. Eckstein, "Polybius, Syracuse, and the Politics of Accommodation," *GRBS* 26 (1985): 265–82. Polybius' opposition to democracy contributed significantly to his judgment on the Achaean War and to his personal involvement in the affairs of his country after 146. I discuss this point (which goes back to Fustel de Coulanges) in an article entitled "Polybios, Rome, and the Akhaian War," forthcoming in *Monographies en Archéologie et Histoire Classiques de l'Université McGill,* ed. J. M. Fossey (Amsterdam).

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